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Shaun	   Nichols	   has	   proposed	   a	   useful	   distinction	   regarding	   three	   different	  projects	   in	   the	   inquiry	  of	   free	  will	  and	  responsibility:	  a	  descriptive	  project,	  a	  substantive	  projects,	  and	  a	  prescriptive	  project1.	  In	  this	  article	  we	  address	  two	  issues	   that	   have	   been	   recently	   debated	   in	   the	   literature	   on	   free	   will,	   moral	  responsibility	   and	   the	   theory	   of	   punishment:	   the	   first	   issue	   concerns	   the	  descriptive	   project,	   the	   second	   both	   the	   substantive	   and	   the	   prescriptive	  project.	  	  The	   first	   issue	   concerns	   the	   impact	   that	   the	   evidence	   for	   determinism,	  supposedly	   shown	   by	   cognitive	   sciences,	   would	   have,	   if	   popularized,	   on	   the	  ordinary	  practice	  of	   responsibility	  attributions.	  On	   theoretical,	  historical	   and	  empirical	   grounds,	   we	   claim	   that	   there	   is	   no	   rationale	   for	   fearing	   that	   the	  spread	   of	   neurocognitive	   findings	   will	   undermine	   the	   folk	   practice	   of	  responsibility	  attributions.	  The	  second	  issue	  concerns	  the	  consequences	  that	  a	  demonstration	  of	  the	  illusoriness	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  would	  have	  for	  the	  theory	  of	  punishment.	  In	   this	   regard,	   two	   opposite	   views	   are	   advocated:	   (i)	   that	   such	   a	  demonstration	  would	  cause	  the	  collapse	  of	  all	  punitive	  practices;	  (ii)	  that,	  on	  the	   contrary,	   such	   a	   demonstration	   would	   open	   the	   way	   to	   more	   humane	  forms	  of	  punishment,	  which	  would	  be	   justified	  on	  purely	  utilitarian	  grounds.	  We	   will	   argue	   that	   these	   views	   are	   both	   wrong,	   since	   whereas	   a	   sound	  punitive	  system	  can	  be	  justified	  without	  any	  reference	  to	  moral	  responsibility,	  it	  will	  certainly	  not	  improve	  the	  humaneness	  of	  punishment.	  
1. Does the Belief in Determinism Prevent Us from Ascribing 
Responsibility? Would	  the	  dissemination	  of	  the	  findings	  regarding	  the	  neurocognitive	  bases	  of	  human	  agency	  undermine	  our	  ordinary	  practice	  of	  responsibility	  attributions?	  According	   to	   Saul	   Smilansky,	   it	   would.	   With	   his	   “free	   will	   illusionism,”	   he	  assumes	   that	   the	   majority	   of	   people	   have	   illusory	   beliefs	   concerning	   the	  existence	   of	   libertarian	   free	   will.	   He	   then	   suggests	   that	   if	   people	   were	  
                                                      1	   The	   descriptive	   project	   aims	   “to	   determine	   the	   character	   of	   folk	   intuitions	  surrounding	  agency	  and	  responsibility.”	  The	  substantive	  project	  makes	  the	  effort	  “to	  determine	   whether	   the	   folk	   views	   are	   correct.”	   The	   prescriptive	   project	   asks	   the	  question	  “whether,	  given	  what	  we	  know	  about	  our	  concepts	  and	  the	  world,	  we	  should	  revise	  or	  preserve	  our	  practices	  that	  presuppose	  moral	  responsibility,	  like	  practices	  of	  blame,	  praise,	  and	  retributive	  punishment”	  (Nichols	  2006,	  58-­‐9). 




disillusioned	   about	   this—that	   is,	   if	   they	   came	   to	   realize	   that	   libertarian	   free	  will	   is	   both	   incoherent	   and	   non-­‐existent—this	   would	   lead	   to	   catastrophic	  personal	  and	  societal	  consequences.	  People	  would	  no	  longer	  find	  meaning	  and	  value	  in	  their	  lives,	  and	  would	  be	  less	  likely	  to	  behave	  morally.	  Consequently,	  it	   would	   be	   preferable	   that	   philosophers	   and	   scientists	   who	   know	   the	  (horrible)	   truth	   about	   the	   nonexistence	   of	   libertarian	   free	   will	   conceal	   it	   in	  order	   to	  avoid	  moral	  nihilism.	  As	  Smilansky	  puts	   it,	   “humanity	   is	   fortunately	  deceived	   on	   the	   free	  will	   issue,	   and	   this	   seems	   to	   be	   a	   condition	   of	   civilized	  morality	  and	  personal	  value”	   (2002,	  500),	   and	   “there	  would	  be	   considerable	  room	  for	  worry	  if	  people	  became	  aware	  of	  the	  absence	  of	  libertarian	  free	  will”	  (2000,	  505,	  note	  7).	  In	  our	  view,	  however,	  Smilansky	  is	  wrong.	  On	  theoretical,	  historical,	  and	  empirical	  grounds	  one	  should	  doubt	  that	  the	  loss	  of	  faith	  in	  our	  free	  will	  would	  have	   bleak	   implications	   at	   both	   the	   societal	   and	   personal	   levels.	   From	   a	  historical	  point	  of	  view	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  look	  at	  the	  periods	  in	  which,	  generally	  for	  religious	   reasons,	   there	   have	   been	   communities	   convinced	   that	   free	   will	   is	  illusory.	  An	   instructive	  example,	   in	  particular,	   is	  offered	  by	  the	  Lutheran	  and	  Calvinist	   communities	  of	   the	   first	  decades,	  which	  accepted	   the	   ideas	  of	   their	  respective	  founding	  fathers	  on	  bound	  will	  and	  predestination.	  In	  the	  sixteenth	  century,	  of	  course,	  these	  views	  were	  not	  based	  (as	  they	  are	  today)	  on	  the	  idea	  that	   the	   natural	   world	   is	   governed	   by	   deterministic	   laws,	   but	   by	   God’s	  prescience	   and	   providence.	   From	   the	   point	   of	   view	   that	   interests	   us	   here,	  however,	  this	  fact	  does	  not	  change	  the	  substance	  of	  the	  phenomenon:	  what	  is	  interesting	  to	  notice,	  in	  fact,	  it	  is	  that	  the	  members	  of	  those	  communities	  were	  convinced	  that,	  since	  free	  will	  was	  denied	  to	  human	  beings,	   they	  were	  not	   in	  control	  of	  their	  choices,	  deeds	  and	  lives,	  and	  consequently	  that	  they	  were	  not	  responsible	  for	  what	  they	  did.	  Therefore,	  on	  a	  religious	  ground,	  they	  held	  with	  full	   awareness	   the	   beliefs	   in	   the	   illusoriness	   of	   free	  will;	   moreover,	   religion	  mattered	  very	  much	  for	  those	  communities.	  If	  Smilansky	  were	  right,	  therefore,	  very	   bleak	   consequences	   should	   have	   followed	   at	   the	   social,	   judiciary	   and	  political	   levels—but	   this,	   as	   is	   well	   known,	   did	   not	   happen	   at	   all.	   On	   the	  contrary,	   according	   to	   the	   classic	   analysis	   offered	   by	   Max	   Weber	   in	   The	  
Protestant	   Ethic	   and	   the	   Spirit	   of	   Capitalism,	   it	   was	   exactly	   because	   of	   the	  certainty	   with	   which	   the	   protestant	   communities	   of	   the	   origins—and	  especially	   the	   Calvinist	   ones	   (for	   which	   the	   idea	   of	   predestination	   was	   all-­‐reaching)—believed	   humans	   do	   not	   enjoy	   free	   will	   that	   they	   found	   an	  extraordinary	   energy	   in	   their	  worldly	   acting:	   to	   the	   point	   that,	   according	   to	  Weber,	  the	  product	  of	  that	  attitude	  was	  the	  birth	  of	  capitalism.	  Analogously,	  if	  one	  considers	  other	  communities	   that	  accept	   that	   free	  will	   is	  an	   illusion,	  one	  finds	   that	   from	   this	   belief	   no	   destructive	   social	   consequences	   follow.	  On	   the	  contrary,	  sometimes,	  contra	  the	  case	  of	  sixteenth-­‐century	  Protestantism,	  some	  forms	   of	   fatalism	   followed,	   but	   in	   these	   cases	   the	   final	   product	   was	   social	  quietism—which,	   pace	   Smilansky,	   certainly	   cannot	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   form	   of	  widespread	  social	  disorder.	  	  




But,	   besides	   this	   historical	   analogical	   argument,	   one	   can	   appeal	   also	   to	  theoretical	   reasons	   for	   claiming	   that	   the	   inference	   from	   the	   awareness	   of	  being	   unfree	   does	   not	   imply	   that	   we	   should	   abandon	   the	   beliefs	   in	   moral	  responsibility	  and	  the	  retributivist	  conception	  of	  punishment.	  Along	  this	  line,	  in	  the	  already	  mentioned	  Freedom	  and	  Resentment,	  P.	  F.	  Strawson	  developed	  two	   influential	   arguments,	   which	   have	   been	   defined	   “rationalistic	   strategy”	  and	  “naturalistic	  strategy”2.	  According	  to	  the	  rationalistic	  strategy,	  even	  if	  we	  were	  convinced	   that	  determinism	   is	   true,	   it	  would	  be	  rational	   for	  us	   to	  keep	  maintaining	  the	  system	  of	  reactive	  attitudes	  and	  attributions	  of	  responsibility	  on	   which	   our	   view	   of	   agency	   and	   personhood	   is	   presently	   based.	   In	   other	  words,	   human	   beings	   should	   keep	   looking	   at	   themselves	   as	   agents,	   not	   as	  mere	  natural	  objects	  (as	  it	  happens	  when	  we	  deal	  with	  little	  children	  or	  with	  the	  mentally	   handicapped);	   this	   is	   because	   conceiving	  human	  beings	  only	   as	  natural	   objects	   would	   be	   irrational	   since	   that	   attitude	   would	   cause	   us	   to	  diminish	  the	  value	  of	  our	  lives.	  According	  to	  the	  naturalistic	  strategy,	  instead,	  it	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  it	  is	  a	  “natural	  fact”	  about	  human	  beings	  that	  they	  could	  never	  be	  able	  to	  abandon	  the	  system	  of	  reactive	  attitudes	  and	  attributions	  of	  responsibility	  –	  whatever	  science	  or	  philosophy	  has	  to	  say	  on	  the	  subject.	  In	  this	  light,	  even	  if	  we	  reached	  theoretical	  certainty	  that	  we	  are	  causally	  determined	   and	   that	   incompatibilism	   is	   the	   correct	   view	   of	   free	   will	  (incompatibilism	  is	  the	  view	  that	  determinism	  and	  free	  will	  are	  incompatible)	  this	   fact	  would	  have	  no	  practical	   consequences	   for	  our	   lives:	  we	  would	  keep	  interacting	   in	   the	   usual	  ways,	   by	   considering	   each	   other	   responsible	   for	   our	  respective	   deliberations	   and	   intentional	   actions	   (with	   the	   usual	   exceptions	  concerning	   mental	   pathologies	   and	   little	   children).	   Therefore	   the	   idea	   of	  responsibility,	   and	   all	   connected	   practices	   (including	   the	   legal	   ones),	   would	  always	  be	  unaffected	  by	  our	  philosophical	  beliefs.	  Moreover,	   the	   claim	   that	   a	   belief	   in	   determinism	   would	   have	   no	   bleak	  implications,	  can	  be	  argued	  not	  only	  on	  theoretical	  and	  strictly	  philosophical	  grounds,	  but	  also	  at	  an	  empirical	  level.	  It	  is	  well	  known	  that	  philosophers	  have	  made	   competing	   claims	   about	   people’s	   intuitions	   about	   freedom	   and	  responsibility.	   And	   the	   received	   view	   is	   Smilansky’s	   one:	   most	   people	   are	  “intuitive	   incompatibilists”3.	  But	   typically	   these	   claims	  have	  been	  made	  with	  speculative-­‐apriori	   analysis	   about	   what	   our	   folk	   intuitions	   on	   the	   issue	   are.	  Recently,	  however,	  some	  experimental	  philosophers	  have	  tested	  these	  claims	  about	   folk	   judgments	   of	   free	   will	   and	   moral	   responsibility	   in	   a	   more	  
                                                      2 We	  are	  following	  Russell’s	  (1995)	  useful	  analysis	  here.	   3 Robert	   Kane,	   e.g.,	   writes:	   “In	   my	   experience,	   most	   ordinary	   persons	   start	   out	   as	  natural	  incompatibilists.	  They	  believe	  there	  is	  some	  kind	  of	  conflict	  between	  freedom	  and	  determinism;	  and	   the	   idea	   that	   freedom	  and	  responsibility	  might	  be	  compatible	  with	   determinism	   looks	   to	   them	   at	   first	   like	   a	   »quagmire«	   of	   evasion	   (James)	   or	   »a	  wretched	  subterfuge«	  (Kant).	  Ordinary	  persons	  have	   to	  be	   talked	  out	  of	   this	  natural	  incompatibilism	   by	   the	   clever	   arguments	   of	   philosophers”	   (1999,	   217).	   And	   Galen	  Strawson:	  “It	   is	   in	  our	  nature	  to	  take	  determinism	  to	  pose	  a	  serious	  problem	  for	  our	  notions	  of	  responsibility	  and	  freedom”	  (1986,	  89). 




systematic	  way4.	  The	  results	  have	  been	  mixed:	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  yet	  if	  laypersons	  are	  naturally	  incompatibilist	  or	  compatibilist.	  Nahmias	   and	   colleagues,	   for	   example,	   have	   carried	   out	   a	   number	   of	  studies	  in	  which	  participants	  (college	  students	  who	  were	  unaware	  of	  the	  free	  will	   debate)	   were	   shown	   three	   different	   scenarios	   describing	   deterministic	  universes5.	   Following	   each	   scenario,	   participants	   were	   asked	   a	   range	   of	  questions,	  including	  whether	  a	  certain	  person	  in	  that	  scenario	  acted	  freely	  and	  was	  morally	  blameworthy.	  One	  of	  these	  scenarios	  was	  the	  “Jeremy	  case”:	  Imagine	   that	   in	   the	  next	   century	  we	  discover	  all	   the	   laws	  of	  nature,	  and	  we	  build	  a	  supercomputer	  which	  can	  deduce	  from	  these	  laws	  of	  nature	  and	  from	  the	  current	  state	  of	  everything	  in	  the	  world	  exactly	  what	  will	  be	  happening	  in	  the	  world	  at	  any	  future	  time.	  It	  can	  look	  at	  everything	  about	  the	  way	  the	  world	   is	  and	  predict	  everything	  about	  how	   it	   will	   be	   with	   100%	   accuracy.	   Suppose	   that	   such	   a	  supercomputer	  existed,	  and	   it	   looks	  at	   the	  state	  of	   the	  universe	  at	  a	  certain	   time	   on	  March	   25th,	   2150	   A.D.,	   twenty	   years	   before	   Jeremy	  Hall	   is	   born.	  The	   computer	   then	  deduces	   from	   this	   information	   and	  the	   laws	   of	   nature	   that	   Jeremy	   will	   definitely	   rob	   Fidelity	   Bank	   at	  6:00	   PM	   on	   January	   26th,	   2195.	   As	   always,	   the	   supercomputer’s	  prediction	   is	   correct;	   Jeremy	   robs	   Fidelity	   Bank	   at	   6:00	   PM	   on	  January	  26th,	  2195	  (Nahmias	  et	  al.	  2005,	  566).	  Subjects	  were	  asked	  to	  indicate	  whether	  or	  not	  Jeremy	  robbed	  Fidelity	  Bank	  of	  his	  own	  free	  will;	  and	  whether	  or	  not	  he	  was	  morally	  blameworthy	  for	  robbing	  the	  bank.	  A	   large	  majority	  of	   the	  subjects	  gave	  compatibilist	  answers	   to	  both	  questions:	  76%	  judged	  that	  Jeremy	  acted	  of	  his	  own	  free	  will;	  83%	  responded	  that	   Jeremy	  was	  morally	   blameworthy	   for	   robbing	   the	   bank6.	   These	   results	  seem	   to	   offer	   evidence	   that	   a	   significant	  majority	   of	   laypersons	   are	   “natural	  compatibilists”,	  and	  thus	  call	  for	  an	  explanation	  for	  why	  so	  many	  philosophers	  —including	  Smilansky—have,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  thought	  that	  most	  people	  have	  intuitions	  that	  support	  incompatibilism.	  According	  to	  Nichols	  and	  Knobe	  (2007),	  the	  divergence	  between	  Nahmias	  et	   al.’s	   psychological	   findings	   and	   philosophers’	   claims,	   stems	   from	   the	  instability	   of	   our	   intuitions	   on	   vignettes	   of	   freedom,	   determinism,	   and	  responsibility.	  Their	  hypothesis	  is	  that	  the	  participants	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  give	  compatibilist	   answers	   to	   concrete	   questions	   about	   particular	   affect-­‐laden	  cases	  (such	  as	  robbing	  a	  bank	  or	  killing	  a	  man),	  but	  incompatibilist	  answers	  to	  
abstract	   questions	   concerning	   more	   general	   moral	   principles.	   If	   so,	   the	  
                                                      4 Experimental	   philosophy	   is	   a	   new	   area	   of	   research	   that	   involves	   the	   gathering	   of	  empirical	  data	  to	  tackle	  philosophical	  problems.	  Cf.	  Knobe	  &	  Nichols	  (2008). 5 For	   complete	   information	   on	   the	   methodology	   and	   results	   of	   these	   studies,	   see	  Nahmias,	   Morris,	   Nadelhoffer,	   &	   Turner	   (2005).	   For	   further	   discussion	   of	   the	  philosophical	  implications	  of	  these	  studies	  and	  this	  methodology,	  cf.	  Nahmias,	  Morris,	  Nadelhoffer,	  &	  Turner	  (2006). 6 For	  similar	  findings,	  cf.	  Woolfolk,	  Doris,	  &	  Darley	  (2006). 




difference	  between	  psychological	  findings	  and	  philosophers’	  claims	  is	  due	  to	  a	  difference	  between	  two	  different	  ways	  of	  framing	  the	  relevant	  question.	  In	  one	  experiment,	  participants	  were	  presented	  with	  a	  description	  of	  two	  universes,	   A	   and	   B.	   Universe	   A	   is	   a	   universe	   alternate	   to	   ours,	   in	   which	  “everything	  that	  happens	  is	  completely	  caused	  by	  whatever	  happened	  before	  it.”	  This	  includes	  human	  decisions,	  which	  participants	  are	  told	  “had	  to	  happen”	  as	   they	   did.	   By	   contrast,	   in	   Universe	   B	   “almost	   everything	   that	   happens	   is	  completely	   caused	   by	   whatever	   happened	   before	   it”;	   the	   one	   exception	   is	  human	  decision	  making,	  and	  hence	  decisions	  do	  not	  have	  to	  happen	  in	  the	  way	  in	   which	   in	   fact	   they	   do	   happen.	   When	   asked	   which	   universe	   more	   closely	  resembles	  our	  own,	  90%	  of	  subjects	  chose	  the	  indeterministic	  Universe	  B.	  	  Participants	  were	   then	   randomly	   assigned	   to	   one	   of	   two	   groups,	   one	   of	  which	  was	  presented	  with	  a	  scenario	  in	  the	  “abstract”	  condition,	  and	  the	  other	  in	  the	  “concrete”	  condition.	  The	  subjects	  in	  the	  abstract	  condition	  were	  asked	  the	  following	  low-­‐affect	  question:	  “In	  Universe	  A,	  is	  it	  possible	  for	  a	  person	  to	  be	   fully	   morally	   responsible	   for	   their	   actions?”	   In	   this	   condition,	   86%	   of	  subjects	  gave	  the	  incompatibilist	  response	  that	   it	   is	  not	  possible	  for	  a	  person	  to	   be	   fully	   morally	   responsible	   in	   Universe	   A.	   By	   contrast,	   in	   the	   concrete	  condition	  participants	  were	  asked	  a	  high-­‐affect	  question:	  In	   Universe	   A,	   a	   man	   named	   Bill	   has	   become	   attracted	   to	   his	  secretary,	  and	  he	  decides	  that	  the	  only	  way	  to	  be	  with	  her	  is	  to	  kill	  his	  wife	  and	  3	  children.	  He	  knows	  that	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  escape	  from	  his	  house	   in	   the	   event	   of	   a	   fire.	   Before	   he	   leaves	   on	   a	   business	   trip,	   he	  sets	  up	  a	  device	  in	  his	  basement	  that	  burns	  down	  the	  house	  and	  kills	  his	   family.	   Is	   Bill	   fully	   morally	   responsible	   for	   killing	   his	   wife	   and	  children?	  (Nichols	  &	  Knobe	  2007,	  110-­‐111).	  In	   this	   concrete	   and	   high-­‐affect	   condition,	   72%	   of	   subjects	   gave	   the	  
compatibilist	  response	  that	  Bill	  is	  fully	  morally	  responsible	  for	  killing	  his	  wife	  and	  children.	  According	  to	  Nichols	  and	  Knobe,	  these	  findings	  suggest	  that	  the	  intuitions	  about	  the	  relations	  between	  determinism	  and	  responsibility	  vary	  according	  to	  the	   affective	   framing	   of	   the	   scenario.	   When	   participants	   come	   to	   deal	   with	  macroscopic	  violations	  of	  moral	  norms,	   they	  experience	  a	   “reactive	  attitude”	  (e.g.,	  moral	   anger	  or	   indignation)	   that	  makes	   them	  unable	   to	   correctly	  apply	  the	   underlying	   incompatibilist	   folk	   theory	   of	   moral	   responsibility.	   The	  compatibilist	  intuitions	  are	  then	  the	  result	  of	  “performance	  errors”	  caused	  by	  the	   distorting	   influence	   of	   emotion	   on	   moral	   judgment;	   that	   is,	   the	   bias	  triggered	  by	  the	  strong	  emotion	  prevents	  subjects	  from	  making	  the	  inference	  that	   by	   contrast	   works	   at	   the	   abstract	   level	   and	   leads	   to	   conclude	   that	  determinism	   rules	  out	   responsibility.	  This	  hypothesis	   is	   called	   “Performance	  Error	   Model,”	   and	   it	   claims	   that	   folks	   have	   apparent,	   but	   not	   genuine	  compatibilist	  intuitions.	  However,	  Nahmias	  and	  collaborators	  (Nahmias	  2006;	  Turner	  &	  Nahmias	  2006;	  Nahmias,	  Coates,	  &	  Kvaran	  2007;	  Nahmias	  &	  Murray,	  forthcoming)	  have	  




argued	   that	  Nichols	  and	  Knobe’s	   scenarios	  do	  not	  allow	  us	   to	   interpret	   their	  evidence	   as	   supporting	   the	   claim	   that	   most	   people	   have	   incompatibilist	  intuitions.	   Nahmias	   postulates	   that	  what	   induces	   the	   participants	   in	  Nichols	  and	   Knobe’s	   experiment	   to	   deny	   free	   will	   and	   moral	   responsibility	   is	   their	  presupposition	   that	   determinism	   implies	   that	   the	   causes	   of	   behavior	  bypass	  our	   deliberations	   and	   conscious	   purposes.	   If	   the	   “bypassing”	   construal	   of	  determinism	   were	   correct,	   compatibilism	   would	   imply	   the	   truth	   of	  
epiphenomenalism	  about	  our	  conscious	  mental	  life,	  or	  it	  might	  take	  the	  form	  of	  
fatalism.	  However,	  Nahmias	  argues,	   to	   think	   that	  determinism	  entails	   such	  a	  “bypassing”	   is	   simply	   a	   mistake.	   According	   to	   compatibilists,	   determinism	  does	  not	  make	  our	  deliberations	  and	  conscious	  purposes	  causally	  irrelevant	  to	  what	   we	   do.	   For	   so	   long	   as	   our	   mental	   states	   are	   part	   of	   a	   deterministic	  sequence	  of	  events,	  they	  play	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  determining	  what	  will	  happen.7	  But	   “if	   the	   reason	   people	   express	   incompatibilist	   intuitions	   is	   that	   they	  mistakenly	  take	  determinism	  to	  entail	  bypassing,	  then	  those	  intuitions	  do	  not	  in	  fact	  support	  the	  conclusion	  that	  determinism,	  when	  properly	  understood,	  is	  incompatible	  with	  free	  will”	  (Nahmias	  &	  Murray,	  forthcoming).	  Summarizing,	   whether	   laypersons	   are	   naturally	   incompatibilist	   or	  compatibilist	  is	  still	  an	  open	  empirical	  question.	  This	  said,	  what	  is	  particularly	  interesting	  for	  us	  here	  is	  that	  a	  study	  by	  Roskies	  and	  Nichols	  (2008)	  has	  put	  in	  relation	  the	  experimental	  philosophy	  of	   free	  will	  with	  Smilansky’s	  prediction	  that	   the	   acceptance	   of	   determinism	   will	   lead	   to	   moral	   catastrophe.	   Roskies	  and	   Nichols	   have	   explored	   a	   important	   difference	   in	   the	   aforementioned	  studies:	   In	   Nahmias	   and	   colleagues’	   “Jeremy	   case”	   the	   scenario	   is	   set	   in	   our	  
own	  world,	   whereas	   in	   Nichols	   and	   Knobe’s	   study	   the	   scenario	   is	   set	   in	   an	  
alternate	   universe.	   Roskies	   and	   Nichols	   predicted	   that	   intuitions	   about	   free	  will	   and	   moral	   responsibility	   would	   be	   sensitive	   to	   whether	   deterministic	  scenarios	  are	  described	  as	  actual,	  in	  our	  world,	  or	  merely	  possible	  (i.e.,	  true	  in	  some	  other	  possible	  world).	  To	  test	  this	  prediction,	  a	  group	  of	  subjects	  were	  randomly	  assigned	  to	  one	  of	  two	  conditions:	  Actual	  and	  Alternate.	   In	  both	  conditions	  participants	  were	  shown	  two	  short	  non-­‐technical	  descriptions	  of	  a	  deterministic	  universe.	  In	  the	  Actual	  condition,	  the	  description	  clearly	   implies	  that	  one	  is	  talking	  about	  our	  universe:	  Many	  eminent	  scientists	  have	  become	  convinced	  that	  every	  decision	  a	   person	  makes	   is	   completely	   caused	   by	  what	   happened	  before	   the	  decision—given	  the	  past,	  each	  decision	  has	  to	  happen	  the	  way	  that	  it	  does.	   These	   scientists	   think	   that	   a	   person’s	   decision	   is	   always	   an	  
                                                      7	  But	   then	   it	   is	  not	  determinism	  but	   reductionism	   that	   threatens	   the	  notions	  of	   free	  will	   and	   responsibility:	   “…	   a	   principal	   psychological	   mechanism	   that	   drives	  incompatibilist	   intuitions	   involves	   people’s	   fear	   of	   reductionistic	   descriptions	   of	  deliberation	   and	   decision-­‐making”	   (Nahmias	   2006,	   229).	   Roskies	   (2006,	   422)	   notes	  that	   similar	   points	   have	   been	   made	   by	   Kim	   (1998),	   Flanagan	   (2002),	   and	   Dennett	  (2003). 




inevitable	   result	   of	   their	   genetic	   makeup	   combined	   with	  environmental	   influences.	  So	   if	  a	  person	  decides	   to	  commit	  a	  crime,	  this	   can	   always	   be	   explained	   as	   a	   result	   of	   past	   influences.	   Any	  individual	   who	   had	   the	   same	   genetic	   makeup	   and	   the	   same	  environmental	  influences	  would	  have	  decided	  exactly	  the	  same	  thing.	  This	   is	   because	   a	   person’s	   decision	   is	   always	   completely	   caused	   by	  what	  happened	  in	  the	  past	  (Roskies	  &	  Nichols	  2008,	  3).	  In	  the	  Alternate	  condition,	  it	  is	  explicitly	  said	  that	  the	  universe	  is	  not	  ours	  by	  adding	   to	   the	   just	   mentioned	   passage	   the	   following	   incipit:	   “Imagine	   an	  alternate	  universe,	  Universe	  A,	  that	  is	  much	  like	  earth.	  But	  in	  Universe	  A,	  many	  eminent	  scientists	  have	  become	  convinced	  that	  in	  their	  universe… .”	  	  In	   both	   conditions,	   participants	   were	   then	   asked	   to	   rate	   their	   level	   of	  agreement	  with	  three	  statements:	  in	  such	  a	  world:	  (i) it	  is	  impossible	  for	  people	  to	  be	  fully	  morally	  responsible	  for	  their	  actions;	  	  (ii) people	  should	  still	  be	  morally	  blamed	  for	  committing	  crimes;	  and	  	  (iii) it	  is	  impossible	  for	  people	  to	  make	  truly	  free	  choices.	  	  The	  results	  were	  that,	  compared	  with	  the	  participants	  in	  the	  Actual	  condition,	  the	  participants	  in	  the	  Alternate	  condition	  gave	  higher	  ratings	  of	  agreement	  to	  the	  statements	  (i)	  and	  (iii)	  but	  lower	  levels	  of	  agreement	  to	  the	  statement	  (ii).	  In	   short,	   when	   participants	   were	   asked	   to	   imagine	   that	   our	   universe	   was	  deterministic,	   they	  tended	  to	  answer	  that	   in	  such	  a	  situation	  it	  would	  still	  be	  possible	  for	  agents	  to	  be	  morally	  responsible,	  blameworthy,	  and	  able	  to	  make	  free	   choices	   (i.e.,	   they	   would	   give	   responses	   in	   accordance	   with	  compatibilism).	   However,	   participants	   were	   likely	   to	   say	   that	   people	   in	   an	  
another	  deterministic	  universe	  would	  not	  be	  fully	  responsible	  and	  not	  able	  to	  make	   free	   choices,	   and	   hence	   that	   perpetrators	   of	   crimes	   would	   not	   be	  blameworthy.	  And	  the	  latter	  is	  of	  course	  an	  incompatibilist	  response.	  In	   this	   light	  we	  can	   therefore	   reconsider	  our	   issue:	  would	  a	  widespread	  acceptance	   of	   determinism	   undermine	   the	   folk	   practice	   of	   responsibility	  attribution?	  Roskies	  and	  Nichols	  argue	  that	  their	  experiment	  is	  relevant	  to	  this	  issue	  in	  at	  least	  two	  ways.	  First,	  it	  puts	  forward	  a	  hypothesis	  about	  the	  source	  of	  the	  widespread	  expectation	  that	  the	  belief	  in	  determinism	  would	  lead	  us	  to	  give	   up	   our	   belief	   in	  moral	   responsibility:	  when	   the	   deterministic	  world	  we	  are	   asked	   to	   consider	   is	   not	   our	   own	   (the	  Alternate	   case),	  we	   tend	   to	   claim	  that	  moral	  responsibility	   is	   impossible.	  Second,	   the	  experiment	  suggests	   that	  even	   if	   we	   should	   come	   to	   believe	   that	   determinism	   holds	   in	   the	   actual	  world,	  such	  a	  belief	  would	  not	  undermine	  our	  responsibility	  judgements.	  This	  is	   evidence	   against	   Smilansky’s	   claim	   that	   a	   widespread	   acceptance	   of	  determinism	  would	  lead	  people	  to	  moral	  nihilism.	  An	  oft-­‐cited	  study	  by	  Vohs	  and	  Schooler	  (2008),	  however,	  seems	  to	  offer	  evidence	  against	  Roskies	  and	  Nichols’	  anti-­‐nihilist	  conclusion.	  They	  report	  two	  experiments	   that	   suggest	   that,	   when	   participants	   were	   primed	   to	   question	  




their	  belief	  in	  free	  will,	  they	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  cheat.	  In	  the	  first	  experiment	  they	  cheated	  on	  a	  cognitive	  task,	  and	  in	  the	  second	  experiment	  they	  overpaid	  themselves	  for	  performances	  on	  a	  cognitive	  task.	  This	  study	  inspired	  another	  paper	   by	   Baumeister,	   Masicampo,	   and	   DeWall	   (2009).	   Using	   similar	  methodology,	   they	   report	   that	   inducing	   disbelief	   in	   free	   will	   in	   participants	  increases	  aggression	  and	  reduces	  helpfulness.	  Let	  us	  consider	  Vohs	  and	  Schooler’s	  first	  experiment.	  30	  undergraduates	  were	   randomly	   assigned	   to	   two	   conditions.	   In	   the	   “anti-­‐free-­‐will	   condition”,	  participants	  read	  a	  passage	  from	  a	  chapter	  of	  Francis	  Crick’s	  The	  Astonishing	  
Hypothesis	   in	   which	   it	   is	   claimed	   that	   “rational,	   high-­‐minded	   people—including,	  according	  to	  Crick,	  most	  scientists	  –	  now	  recognize	  that	  actual	  free	  will	   is	  an	   illusion,	  and	  also	  [claim]	  that	   the	   idea	  of	   free	  will	   is	  a	  side	  effect	  of	  the	   architecture	   of	   the	   mind”	   (Vohs	   &	   Schooler	   2008,	   50).	   In	   the	   control	  condition,	   participants	   read	   another	   excerpt	   from	  Crick’s	   book,	   a	   chapter	   on	  consciousness	  where	   free	  will	   is	   not	  mentioned.	   In	   a	   second	   stage,	   subjects	  were	   given	   a	   computer-­‐based	   math	   test	   which	   featured	   an	   opportunity	   to	  cheat.	   The	   results	   seem	   to	   show	   that	   participants	   cheated	   more	   frequently	  after	   reading	   the	   anti-­‐free-­‐will	   excerpt	   than	   after	   reading	   the	   control	   one.	  Vohs	  and	  Schooler	  conclude	  that	  an	  exposure	  to	  deterministic	  messages	  gives	  place	   to	   a	   weakening	   of	   free-­‐will	   beliefs,	   thus	   increasing	   the	   likelihood	   of	  unethical	  actions	  (2008,	  53-­‐54).	  	  However,	  these	  results	  could	  hardly	  be	  used	  as	  evidence	  for	  Smilansky’s	  catastrophism.	  Sommers	  (2010)	  has	  rightly	  noticed	   that	  Vohs	  and	  Schooler’s	  study	  assumes	  that	  “our	  behavior	   just	  after	  hearing	  that	  a	  cherished	  belief	   is	  false	   has	   [some]	   bearing	   on	   how	  we	  would	   act	   after	   further	   reflection.”	   But	  there	  is	  no	  study	  that	  records	  this	  correlation.	  Perhaps,	  then,	  this	  study	  “may	  merely	  have	  shown	  that	  people	  should	  not	  become	  hard	  determinists	  15	  min	  before	  they	  submit	  their	  tax	  return.”	  Indeed,	  these	  are	  short-­‐term	  implications	  of	   a	   limited	  denial	  of	   free	  will,	  whereas	  Smilansky’s	   claim	  regards	   “the	   long-­‐term	   implications	  of	  a	  widespread	  denial	  of	   free	  will”	   (Sommers	  2010,	  207).	  Moreover,	  Vohs	  and	  Schooler’s	   results	   tell	  us	  very	   little	  about	   the	  effect	   that	  the	   weakening	   of	   free-­‐will	   beliefs	   might	   have	   on	   more	   significant	   moral	  behaviors—“cheating	  on	  a	  math	   test	   is	  one	   thing;	   robbing	  banks	   is	  another,”	  Nahmias	  rightly	  notices	  (forthcoming,	  note	  16).	  The	   problem	   is	   that,	   as	   Nadelhoffer	   and	   Feltz	   warn	   us,	   it	   is	   really	   very	  difficult	   to	   test	   Smilansky’s	   claim.	   In	   fact,	   suppose	  you	   run	  an	  experiment	   in	  which	   you	   ask	   believers	   in	   freedom	   and	   responsibility	   to	   predict	   how	   they	  would	  behave	   if	   they	  came	   to	   think	   that	   their	  beliefs	  are	   the	  product	  of	   self-­‐illusory	  mechanisms.	  The	  trouble	  is	  that:	  ...	  there	  are	  several	  reasons	  to	  suspect	  that	  simply	  asking	  people	  what	  they	   would	   do	   if	   they	   came	   to	   abandon	   some	   of	   their	   most	  fundamental	   beliefs	   would	   produce	   unreliable	   data.	   One	   of	   the	  primary	   shortcomings	   of	   this	   kind	   of	   study	   is	   that	   we	   have	   good	  reason	   to	   suspect	   that	   people	   will	   not	   be	   good	   judges	   of	   how	   they	  




would	  behave	  if	  they	  no	  longer	  believed	  in	  [libertarian	  free	  will]	  and	  [ultimate	  moral	  responsibility]	  (Nadelhoffer	  &	  Feltz	  2007,	  210).	  	  Numerous	   findings	  of	  social	  psychology	   invite	  us	   to	  distrust	   the	  reliability	  of	  predictions	   that	   people	   can	   make	   about	   their	   own	   future	   behavior.	  Nadelhoffer	   and	   Feltz	   (2007,	   210-­‐11)	   remind	   us	   that	   prior	   to	   the	   famous	  shock	   studies	   by	   Milgram	   (1963),	   Milgram	   polled	   his	   colleagues	   and	   Yale	  University	   senior-­‐year	   psychology	   majors	   to	   establish	   what	   they	   thought	  would	   be	   the	   maximum	   shock	   administered	   by	   the	   participants	   in	   the	  experiment:	  their	  predictions	  ranged	  anywhere	  from	  195	  volts	  to	  300	  volts.	  In	  contrast,	   no	   subject	   stopped	   before	   300	   volts,	   and	   26	   of	   40	   participants	  administered	  what	  they	  believed	  to	  be	  the	  maximum	  shock	  of	  450	  volts.	  These	  results	   suggest	   that	   the	   degree	   of	   obedience	   among	   participants	   was	   far	  higher	   than	   people	   had	   predicted.	   Moreover,	   Nadelhoffer	   and	   Feltz	   notice,	  “[p]resumably,	  had	  people	  been	  asked	   to	  predict	  how	   they	   themselves	  would	  behave	   rather	   than	   being	   asked	   how	   other	   people	   would	   behave,	   their	  predictions	  would	  have	  been	  even	   less	  reliable”	   (note	  11).	   In	  support	  of	   this	  claim	   they	   quote	   an	   experiment	   by	   Gilbert	   et	   al.	   (2002)	   that	   shows	   that	   in	  predicting	  we	  often	  overestimate	  the	  effect	   that	  negative	  events	  will	  have	  on	  our	  lives.	  Alternatively,	   we	   could	   try	   to	   carry	   out	   a	   longitudinal	   research	   on	   the	  behavior	  of	  people	  who	  have	  denied	  free	  will	  and	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  long	  time.	   In	   this	  case,	   the	   trouble—Sommers	  says—is	   that	   “those	   individuals	  are	  few	  and	  far	  between”	  (2010,	  207).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  we	  could	  get	  around	  the	  logistic	   impracticability	   of	   such	   a	   project	   by	   looking	   back	   to	   the	  aforementioned	   historical	   cases	   of	   the	   Lutheran	   and	   Calvinist	   free-­‐will	  deniers.	  Moreover,	   “Smilansky	   himself	   is	   presumably	   perfectly	   able	   to	   live	   a	  morally	   acceptable	   and	   personally	   gratifying	   life,	   filled	   with	   meaningful	  choices	  and	   loving	  relationships”	   (Nadelhoffer	  &	  Feltz	  2007,	  211-­‐2).	  And	   the	  same	   seems	   to	   hold	   for	   other	   skeptical	   philosophers	   like,	   say,	   Diderot	   and	  Spinoza.	   Why	   then	   should	   we	   be	   afraid	   that	   the	   same	   disillusionment	   will	  cause	  inauspicious	  and	  long-­‐term	  consequences	  to	  the	  masses?	  
2. Cooperating and Punishing According	   to	   a	   common	   opinion,	   our	   ideal	   of	   justice—and	   the	   punitive	  practices	   of	   the	   legal	   systems	   that	   purport	   to	   express	   it—presupposes	   the	  retributivist	   conception	   of	   punishment.	   Several	   authors	   (including	   Greene	  &	  Cohen	   2004),	   however,	   disagree	   with	   this	   opinion,	   by	   arguing	   that	   the	  conception	   of	   punishment	   that	   better	   embodies	   our	   ideal	   of	   justice	   is	   the	  utilitarian	  one.	  Greene	  and	  Cohen	  claim	  that	  we	  already	  have	  good	  reasons	  to	  think	  that	  free	  will	  is	  illusory,	  but	  (differently	  from	  Gazzaniga)	  they	  think	  that	  belief	  can	  have	   extremely	   beneficial	   and	   progressive	   consequences	   for	   society	   overall.	  This	   is	   because,	   according	   to	   them,	   it	  makes	   no	   sense	   to	   punish	   individuals	  




who	  could	  not	  act	  differently	  from	  how	  they	  have	  in	  fact	  acted,	  since	  they	  are	  genetically	  and	  neurophysiologically	  determined:	   “At	   this	   time,	   the	   law	  deals	  firmly	   but	   mercifully	   with	   individuals	   whose	   behaviour	   is	   obviously	   the	  product	  of	   forces	   that	   are	  ultimately	  beyond	   their	   control.	   Someday,	   the	   law	  may	   treat	   all	   convicted	   criminals	   this	   way.	   That	   is,	   humanely.”	   (Greene	   &	  Cohen	  2004,	  1784).	  	  Green	  and	  Cohen’s	  view,	  however,	  is	  simplistic.	  Giving	  up	  the	  idea	  of	  free	  will	   implies	   that	   one	   has	   to	   abandon	   the	   galaxy	   of	   notions	   that	   essentially	  depends	   on	   the	   idea	   of	   freedom—such	   as	   responsibility,	   desert,	   merit,	   and	  guilt.8	  But,	  without	  these	  notions,	  one	  is	  left	  with	  a	  purely	  utilitarian	  theory	  of	  punishment,	   according	   to	   which	   any	   punishment	   could	   be	   inflicted	   to	  anybody,	  as	  long	  as	  the	  general	  utility	  were	  increased9.	  In	  this	  scenario,	  ideas	  such	   as	   punishment	   or	   blame	   are	   unjustified:	   there	   is	   no	   justice	   ever	   to	   be	  restored,	  no	   responsibility	   to	  be	   considered.	  The	  only	   things	   that	  have	   to	  be	  done	  are	  those	  which	  are	  useful:	  to	  rehabilitate	  the	  wrongdoer	  back	  into	  social	  life,	   set	   examples	   that	   can	   deter	   other	   potential	  wrongdoers,	   protect	   society	  against	  dangerous	  individuals.	  Nothing	  more	  than	  that.	  This	   view	   does	   not	   fit	   well	   with	   our	   ideals	   of	   justice.	   But	   it	   should	   be	  noticed	   that,	   if	   put	   into	   effect,	   it	   would	   not	   generate	   the	   collapse	   of	   our	  judiciary	   system,	   contrary	   to	   what	   has	   been	   argued	   by	   several	   authors	  (Gazzaniga	   2008;	   Caruana	   2010).	   In	   fact,	   there	   are	   many	   cases	   of	   judicial	  systems	  that	  are	  based	  on	  similar	  kinds	  of	  views.	  Clear	  approximations	  to	  the	  ideal	  of	   a	  purely	  utilitarian	   judicial	   system	  are	  offered,	   for	   example,	   in	   some	  East-­‐Asian	   countries,	   which	   proudly	   defend	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   so-­‐called	   “Asian	  values”	  –	  that	  is,	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  prosperity	  of	  the	  community	  has	  always	  to	  have	   priority	   on	   what	   is	   good	   for	   the	   individuals.	   In	   this	   perspective,	  punishing	  an	  innocent	  person	  may	  sometimes	  be	  acceptable	  or	  even	  required:	  this	  may	  for	  example	  happen	  in	  case	  of	  dangerous	  social	  disorders	  that	  could	  be	  stopped	  by	  finding	  a	  “scapegoat”	  (the	  relevant	  consideration	  in	  these	  cases	  is	  whether	   the	   utility	   for	   society	  would	   be	   higher	   than	   the	   sufferance	   of	   the	  innocent	  person).10	  	  Still,	   a	   utilitarian	   legal	   system	   that	   allows	   such	   easy	  ways	   out	   for	   social	  dilemmas	   seems	   intuitively	   objectionable.	   The	   point,	   however,	   is	   not	   that	  these	   kind	   of	   systems	   would	   generate	   anarchy,	   as	   Gazzaniga	   and	   Caruana	  claim	  (on	  the	  contrary,	  they	  offer	  good,	  if	  too	  easy,	  answers	  to	  the	  menace	  of	  anarchy),	  but	  that	  they	  do	  not	  respect	  the	  fundamental	  fairness	  requirements	  that	   our	   intuition	   of	   justice	   carries.	   It	   is	   in	   order	   to	   avoid	   such	   very	  unpalatable	   results	   that	   today	   even	  many	   of	   the	  most	   important	   utilitarians	  
                                                      8 An	   exception	   to	   the	   classic	   view	   that	   moral	   responsibility	   requires	   free	   will	   is	  Frankfurt	  (1969),	  which	  is	  criticized	  in	  De	  Caro	  (2004),	  cap.	  IV.	   9 This	  is	  not	  the	  place	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  attempt	  of	  answering	  this	  kind	  of	  problem	  by	  the	  so-­‐called	  “rule-­‐consequentialism”	  is	  not	  satisfying.	  On	  that,	  cf.	  Habib	  (2008).  10 The	  proposal	  of	  developing	  a	  “rule	  utilitarianism”,	   instead	  of	   the	  more	  classic	   “act	  utilitarianism”	   is	   of	   not	   help	   here,	   since	   the	   same	   problem	   would	   raise	   again	   in	   a	  different	  form	  (see:	  Lyons	  1965).	   




accept,	  very	  reasonably	  indeed,	  the	  idea	  of	  “negative	  retribution”,	  according	  to	  which	  nobody	  can	  be	  punished	  who	  is	  not	  guilty.	  The	  classic	  advocate	  of	  this	  view	  is	  H. L. A.	  Hart	  (1968)	  who,	  while	  conceiving	  justification	  of	  punishment	  in	   purely	   utilitarian	   terms,	   regarded	   negative	   retribution	   as	   a	   “limiting	  principle”,	   aimed	  at	   constraining	   the	  distribution	  of	   punishment	  by	   avoiding	  patent	   injustices.	   In	   this	   perspective,	   no	   victim-­‐perpetrator	   should	   be	  punished	  if	  he	  or	  she	   is	  not	  morally	  responsible	   for	  a	  criminal	  action,	  even	  if	  the	  punishment	  would	  provide	  a	  benefit	  to	  society	  overall11.	  	  And	   this	   shows	   that	   moral	   responsibility	   is	   relevant	   not	   only	   for	   all	  retributivist	   views	   (which	   claim	   that	  moral	   responsibility	   is	   a	  necessary	  and	  sufficient	   condition	   for	  punishment),	   but	   also	   for	   the	  utilitarian	  views	  of	   the	  Hartian	  family	  (since	  they	  claim	  that	  moral	  responsibility,	  if	  not	  a	  sufficient,	  is	  at	   least	   a	   necessary	   condition	   of	   punishment).	   The	   crucial	   point	   however,	   is	  that	   according	   to	  most	   authors,	   in	   order	   to	   attribute	  moral	   responsibility	   to	  people,	   we	   have	   to	   attribute	   to	   them	   free	   will	   as	   well	   (either	   in	   the	  compatibilist	   or	   in	   the	   libertarian	   form).	   But	   Gazzaniga	   and	   Caruana,	   on	   the	  pessimistic	   side,	   and	   Greene	   and	   Cohen,	   on	   the	   optimistic	   side,	   defend	   an	  illusionist	   view	   of	   free	   will;	   in	   their	   views,	   therefore,	   all	   concepts	   that	   are	  connected	   with	   free	   will	   (such	   as	   merit,	   responsibility,	   guilt)	   should	   be	  abandoned.	   In	   this	   way,	   none	   of	   these	   authors	   can	   appeal	   to	   the	   notion	   of	  negative	   retribution,	   which	   requires	   the	   concept	   of	  moral	   responsibility	   (or	  some	  other	   concepts	  of	   the	   free	  will	   galaxy).	   It	   follows	   that	   those	  views—by	  using	  purely	  utilitarian	  parameters	   for	  both	  the	   justification	  and	  distribution	  of	  punishment—imply	  a	  conception	  of	  punishment	   that,	   if	  not	  as	  apocalyptic	  as	   Gazzaniga	   and	   Caruana	   think,	   are	   certainly	   very	   far	   from	   being	   as	  progressive	  as	  Greene	  and	  Cohen	  maintain.	  	  Greene	  and	  Cohen’s	  proposal	  of	  an	  utilitarian	  re-­‐engineering	  of	  the	   legal	  system	  can	  be	  opposed	  also	  by	   referring	   to	   some	  experimental	   findings	   that	  concern	   our	   intrinsic	   motivation	   to	   punish.	   There	   is	   robust	   anthropological	  and	  sociological	  evidence	  that	  shows	  that	  the	  members	  of	  a	  community	  react	  to	   norm	   violations	   with	   both	   punitive	   emotions	   (e.g.,	   anger,	   contempt,	   and	  disgust)12	   and	   punitive	   behaviors	   (e.g.,	   criticism,	   condemnation,	   avoiding,	  exclusion,	   or	   aggression).	   These	   informal	  ways	  of	   punishing	  norm	  violations	  seem	  to	  be	  cultural	  universals.	  Nevertheless,	  it	  might	  be	  objected	  that	  in	  these	  cases	   there	   is	   no	   intrinsic	  motivation	   to	   punish.	   That	   is,	   it	  may	   be	   that	   one	  wants	   to	   punish	   someone	   who	   violated	   a	   norm	   for	   some	   egotistical	  instrumental	   reasons—e.g.,	   to	   warn	   the	   transgressors	   as	   a	   deterrent	   from	  committing	  the	  violation	  again.	  Against	  this	  claim,	  we	  can	  refer	  to	  two	  studies	  
                                                      11	   It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  Hart	   is	  a	  utilitarian,	  even	  if	  he	  accepts	  the	   idea	  of	  negative	  retribution,	   since	  he	   refuses	   the	   idea	  of	  positive	   retribution—i.e.,	   he	  does	  not	   claim	  that	  all	  people	  who	  deserve	  punishment	  should	  be	  punished,	  whatever	  consequences	  their	  punishment	  may	  have. 12	   For	   a	   review,	   see:	   Haidt	   (2003).	   These	   punitive	   emotions	   are	   connected	   to	   the	  aforementioned	  Strawson’s	  “reactive	  attitudes”. 




–	   one	   in	   social	   psychology,	   and	   the	   other	   in	   experimental	   economy—that	  serve	   as	   a	   source	   of	   evidence	   for	   the	   hypothesis	   that	   in	   some	   cases	   the	  motivation	  to	  punish	  is	  genuinely	  intrinsic13. In	  a	  study	  by	  Haidt	  and	  Sabini	  (2000)	  participants	  were	  shown	  with	  clips	  from	  Hollywood	  movies	  where	   a	  norm	  violation	  occurred.	   In	   a	   second	   stage	  subjects	  were	   asked	   to	   rate	   several	   alternative	   endings.	   The	   result	  was	   that	  subjects	   were	   likely	   to	   give	   higher	   ratings	   of	   the	   endings	   in	   which	   the	  perpetrators	   (i)	   were	  made	   to	   suffer,	   (ii)	   knew	   that	   their	   suffering	  was	   fair	  repayment	  for	  the	  violation,	  (iii)	  suffered	  as	  much	  as	  the	  victim,	  and	  (iv)	  their	  suffering	   involved	   a	   public	   humiliation.	   Most	   importantly,	   among	   the	  alternative	   endings	   there	   was	   one	   in	   which	   the	   perpetrators	   realized	   they	  did	  wrong	  and	  felt	  a	  genuine	  remorse	  that	  put	  them	  on	  a	  path	  of	  redemption	  and	  rehabilitation.	  That	  subjects	  were	  unsatisfied	  by	  this	  ending	  suggests	  that	  their	   motivation	   to	   punish	   cannot	   be	   characterized	   in	   terms	   of	   selfish	  instrumental	   ends	   (e.g.,	   avoiding	   of	   being	   harmed	   by	   the	   perpetrator	   in	   the	  future);	  rather,	  their	  motivation	  to	  punish	  was	  genuinely	  intrinsic.	  Moreover	   experimental	   economy	   offers	   systematic	   findings	   relevant	   to	  the	   hypothesis	   of	   a	   natural	   inclination	   to	   retributive	   punishment.	   The	  Ultimatum	  Game	   is	   a	   simple	  bargaining	   situation	   in	  which	   the	   experimenter	  provides	  a	  pair	  of	  anonymous	  subjects	  with	  a	  sum	  of	  real	  money	  (e.g.,	  $100)	  for	  a	  one-­‐shot	  interaction	  (Guth,	  Schmittberger,	  &	  Schwarze	  1982).	  One	  of	  the	  pair	  (A)	  has	  to	  offer	  a	  portion	  of	  the	  sum	  to	  a	  second	  player	  (B):	  A	  can	  give	  B	  from	  $1	  to	  $99,	  as	  she	  likes.	  If	  B	  accepts	  the	  offer,	  the	  sum	  is	  split	  as	  proposed;	  if	   B	   rejects	   it	   both	   players	   receive	   nothing.	   According	   to	   classical	   game	  theory,	  since	  A	  takes	  B	  to	  be	  a	  rational	  agent	  for	  whom	  any	  amount	  of	  money	  has	   a	   positive	   utility,	   A	   anticipates	   that	   B	  will	   accept	   any	   offer	   >0.	   A	   should	  therefore	  offer	  the	  smallest	  possible	  amount,	  in	  order	  to	  keep	  as	  much	  money	  as	  possible,	  and	  B	  should	  accept	  any	  proposed	  amount,	  because	  “few	  is	  better	  than	  nothing”.	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  what	  happens.	  Although	  the	  specifics	  vary	  across	  culture	  and	  setting,	  the	  typical	  results	  are	  that	  A	  makes	  offers	  of	  40	  to	  50%	  and	  B	   rejects	  offers	  <20%.	  These	   findings	   suggest	   that	  B	   is	   sensitive	   to	  unfairness	  and	  punishes	  A’s	   inequitable	  offers,	   although	  punishment	  may	  be	  costly	  for	  B	  and	  yield	  no	  material	  gain.	  We	  find	  here	  a	  natural	  desire	  to	  pay	  a	  cost	   in	   order	   to	   send	   the	   signal	   “you	   had	   to	   be	  more	   cooperative”.	   In	   other	  words,	  we	  have	  here	  an	  inclination	  to	  “altruistic	  punitiveness”	  (Fehr	  &	  Gächter	  2002;	  Boyd	  et	  al.	  2003).	  Fehr	   and	   Gächter	   offer	   cogent	   evidence	   for	   the	   hypothesis	   that	  “cooperation	  flourishes	  if	  altruistic	  punishment	  is	  possible,	  and	  breaks	  down	  if	  it	   is	   ruled	  out”	   (2002,	  137).	   In	   a	   “public	   goods”	   experiment	  participants	  had	  the	   option	   to	   co-­‐operate	   by	   contributing	   significantly	   to	   a	   common	   fund	   or	  defect	   by	   not	   contributing	   (Fehr	   &	   Fischbacher	   2004).	   During	   the	   first	   ten	  trials,	  no	  punishment	  was	  allowed.	  During	  trials	  11-­‐20,	  group	  members	  could	  punish	   each	   other	   after	   they	   observed	   each	  member’s	   contribution	   level.	   At	  
                                                      
13 We	  are	  following	  Sripada	  (2005),	  Stich	  &	  Sripada	  (2006),	  Nichols	  (2007,	  2008)	  here. 




the	   beginning	   of	   the	   experiment	   co-­‐operation	   rates	   of	   roughly	   50%	   of	   the	  endowment	   (=20	   monetary	   units)	   were	   observed,	   but	   the	   level	   of	   co-­‐operation	  decreased	  over	   time.	  The	  majority	  of	   subjects	   contributed	  nothing	  to	  the	  public	  good	  in	  the	  trial	  10,	  and	  the	  rest	  contributed	  little.	  In	  period	  11,	  the	  subjects	  were	  informed	  that	  a	  new	  experiment	  would	  start	  in	  which	  they	  would	  have	   the	  opportunity	   to	  punish	   the	  other	  group	  members	   (but	  with	  a	  cost	  for	  themselves)14.	  This	  modification	  immediately	  increased	  co-­‐operation	  levels	   to	   65%	   of	   the	   endowment.	   Then,	   over	   time,	   cooperation	   rose	  dramatically,	  and	  eventually	  almost	  100%	  cooperation	  was	  attained.	  	  Fehr	   and	   Gächter’s	   study	   aims	   to	   show	   that	   “cooperation	   flourishes	   if	  altruistic	   punishment	   is	   possible,	   and	   breaks	   down	   if	   it	   is	   ruled	   out.”	  Therefore,	   if	   this	   line	   of	   research	   takes	   root,	   the	   project	   of	   reforming	  jurisprudence	  without	  retributivist	  punishment	  will	  seem	  “a	  dangerous	  cause”	  (Nichols	   2008).	   And	   this	   is	   still	   more	   important	   since,	   as	   Hart	   has	   clearly	  pointed	   out,	   the	   retributivist	   intuition	   can	   act	   as	   a	   limit	   to	   the	   arbitrary	  applications	  in	  the	  distribution	  of	  punishment.	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Abstract:	  The	  paper	  addresses	  two	  issues	  that	  have	  been	  recently	  debated	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  free	  will,	  moral	  responsibility,	  and	  the	  theory	  of	  punishment.	  The	   first	   issue	   concerns	   the	   descriptive	   project,	   the	   second	   both	   the	  substantive	   and	   the	   prescriptive	   project.	  On	   theoretical,	   historical	   and	  empirical	   grounds,	   we	   claim	   that	   there	   is	   no	   rationale	   for	   fearing	   that	   the	  spread	   of	   neurocognitive	   findings	   will	   undermine	   the	   ordinary	   practice	   of	  responsibility	  attributions.	  We	  hypothetically	  advocate	  two	  opposite	  views:	  (i)	  that	  such	  findings	  would	  cause	  the	  collapse	  of	  all	  punitive	  practices;	  (ii)	  that,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  such	  findings	  would	  open	  the	  way	  to	  more	  humane	  forms	  of	  punishment,	  which	  would	  be	  justified	  on	  purely	  utilitarian	  grounds.	  We	  argue	  that	  these	  views	  are	  both	  wrong,	  since	  whereas	  a	  sound	  punitive	  system	  can	  be	  justified	  without	  any	  reference	  to	  moral	  responsibility,	  it	  will	  certainly	  not	  improve	  the	  humaneness	  of	  punishment.	  	  	  
Keywords:	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